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ARGUMENT

I.

THE CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE
INTERPRETATION OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY ACT AND THE
WRITTEN OPERATING AGREEMENT WERE QUESTIONS OF
LAW FOR THE COURT AND AUTHORIZED DEFENDANTS'
ACTIONS.
A.

Under the LLC Act, the defendants' alleged actions were
authorized as a matter of law because they owned more than twothirds of the profits interests in the LLC.

As noted in Defendants' opening brief, the state legislature has chosen to
grant broad authority as a matter of law to managers of an LLC who also own
more than two-thirds of the sharing interests in the LLC. That authority includes
express statutory authority to take actions that are (allegedly) "in contravention
of. .. an operating agreement. .. " (See Didericksen Br., p. 24.) 1
In its brief, the State recognizes that this issue is one of law to be reviewed
for correctness (State Br., p. 2), but argues that it was not preserved.

As

Defendants have argued, however, the fact that the trial court would not review the
VD

governing operating agreement on the sole ground that this is not a criminal case
suggests a similar futility had counsel asked the court to review the LLC Act. In

1

By order of the Court, briefing has been consolidated in these two cases, but
Defendants initially filed separate opening briefs. Because the two briefs were
substantively identical, Defendants cite to the initial Didericksen brief except
where otherwise noted. Defendants also cite to the Didericksen record.
1
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any event, failing to raise a potentially dispositive defense is plain error, ineffective
assistance of counsel, and manifest injustice. (See Didericksen Br., pp. 33-35.)
In disagreeing, the State argues that Defendants "had no such statutory
right," therefore "there was no error, let alone plain error," and that failing to raise
a "futile" argument is not ineffective assistance. (State Br., pp. 16, 21.) The State
says Defendants are "misreading" the LLC Act, but Defendants are, instead,
reading the Act in its entirety, unlike the State.
The analysis starts with Utah Code § 48-2c-804(4), which states that "no
manager shall have authority to do any act in contravention of the. . . operating
agreement, except as provided in Subsection 6(g)." Subsection 6(g) itself states in
pertinent part, "(ii) members holding 2/3 of the profits interests in the company,
and 2/3 of the managers shall be required for all matters described in Subsection
48-2c-803(3 ). " 2
The State notes that § 48-2c-804(6) (not (6)(g)) includes a prefatory
statement, "Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating

2

The "matters described" in Subsection 48-2c-803(3) include
(a)(i) authorizing a member or any other person to do any act on behalf of
the company that is not in the ordinary course of the company's business, or
business of the kind carried on by the company; ...
(c) resolving any dispute connected with the usual and regular course of the
company's business; [and]
(d) making a substantial change in the business purpose of the company; ...
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agreement of the company .... " According to the State, the Operating Agreement
"otherwise provided" that the unanimous consent of all members was required to
change the purpose of the company, and therefore an action by Defendants without
the Poseys' consent would have been unauthorized even if Defendants held the
required majorities. (State Br., p. 18.)
The State's argument fails to consider the LLC Act as a whole. Under
Section 804( 4), a manager may take certain actions in contravention of an
operating agreement.

Under the State's argument, this section could never be

triggered; a manager could never act in contravention of an operating agreement
because, if the action is in contravention of the operating agreement, that means the
operating agreement "otherwise provides" some prohibition against the action.
The only reasonable meaning of Section 804(4) is that, when it mentioned
804(6)(g), that is what it meant - (6)(g) - which states, in pertinent part, that
"approval" of "member~ holding 2/3 of the profits interests in the company, and
Vil

2/3 of the managers shall be required for all matters described in Subsection 48-2c803(3)." By referencing § 804(6)(g), Section 804(4) was intended to authorize
actions that would otherwise be in contravention of the operating agreement if: 1)
the actions are approved by members holding at least 2/3 interest and 2/3 of the
managers, and 2) those actions are one of the specific "matters described" in
subsection 48-2c-803(3).

3
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The State's contrary interpretation is not only circular but inconsistent with
the actual wording and purpose of the statute. As the State itself suggests, the Act
is intended to afford flexibility to LLC members; one way it achieves that is to
permit those with the biggest stakes (2/3+ interest holders) in conjunction with
those who have been given management authority to take actions in a more flexible
and timely manner. Moreover, to the extent the statute is unclear on this pivotal
point, Utah recognizes the rule of lenity. Watkins, supra, 2013 UT 28, ,r 38 n.3.
An additional problem with the State's argument is that it disregards other
sources of Defendants' statutory authority. As noted above, Subsection 804(6)(g)
(in conjunction with Section 48-2c-803(3)) permits 2/3 interest holders to, inter

alia, "(a)(i) authoriz[e] a member or any other person to do any act on behalf of the
company that is not in the ordinary course of the company's business, or business
of the kind carried on by the company; ... (c) resolv[e] any dispute connected with
the usual and regular course of the company's business; [and] (d) mak[e] a
substantial change in the business purpose of the company ... "
Of those three actions, the State claims a limitation within the Operating
Agreement only as to (d), arguing that the Operating Agreement restricted
Defendants' ability "to change Tivoli' s business purpose" without the Poseys'
consent. (State Br., p. 17.) The State does not claim that there was a similar
restriction in the Operating Agreement on Defendants' authority to take the actions

4 Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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described in (a) or (c).

Indeed, the Operating Agreement itself provides that

Defendants, as the managers, are authorized to resolve "any questions regarding
the conduct of the company business." (See Didericksen Br., pp. 14-15, 32.)
In this regard, the State's argument that the Operating Agreement 1s
ambiguous becomes particularly important.
vl

If the State is correct in that

contention, then both the LLC Act and the Operating Agreement gave Defendants
the authority to resolve that dispute. They did so. If the Poseys did not agree with
that resolution, they had recourse under the LLC Act or in the courts. E.g., Utah
Code §§ Utah Code § 48-2c-710, -807, -809, -1210 (actions available for
misconduct, dissociation, removal of member or manger, or dissolution); OLP,
L.L.C. v. Burningham, 2009 UT 75,225 P.3d 177.

In short, Defendants' actions were authorized under the LLC Act, and this
should have been recognized and addressed by the parties and court below. The
State makes a final argument, however, that "it would not have been obvious on
~

this record that they even had the necessary profits interest to assert the claimed
authority." (State Br., p. 19.) "[F]or purposes of the LLC Act, a member's profits
interests is determined by his 'capital account balances on the date on which
compliance is measured,"' the State says. (Id., citing Utah Code§ 48-2c-803.1 and
Op.Agr. at 3. 7.) The State argues that "Defendants provided no proof of what the
separate capital account balances were on each of the 'date[ s] on which compliance

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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is measured,"' which the State defines as "the separate dates on which they
allegedly authorized each check." (State Br., pp. 19-20.)
In making this argument, the State's brief omits part of § 48-2c-803.l.
Immediately before the quoted clause, the statute says (italics added):
For the purpose of determining compliance with a provision of this
chapter that conditions rights, consents, or actions on the participation
of members holding a certain percentage of the company's profits
interests, unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or
the operating agreement, each member's profit interest shall be
determined based on the members' capital account balances on the
date on which compliance is measured.
Utah Code § 48-2c-803 .1. The Operating Agreement was in evidence and does, in
fact, "otherwise provid[ e]," expressly defining the members' profit interests as
75% Defendants (later increased) and 25% Poseys. (See Didericksen Br., p. 10.)
That is well beyond the two-thirds statutory threshold.

B.

The terms of the Operating Agreement were not ambiguous on the
dispositive issues, or the court should have determined ambiguity
as a threshold matter and instructed the jury accordingly.

The State does not contest that whether Defendants had authority (negating
theft) or had a reasonable belief they had authority (negating intent) turns on the
language of the Operating Agreement. Nor does the State claim that the court
examined the contract or found any of its provisions ambiguous; instead, it simply
sent the document to the jury, without instruction, to give whatever weight it chose.
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On appeal, the State argues that, "when a contract is ambiguous, its
interpretation presents a question of fact that may be submitted to the jury."
(State Br., pp. 2, 22-29.) That is not correct -juries do not "interpret" agreements,
they determine what parties intended - if (and only if) a court has first ruled that
the parties themselves did not clearly articulate it, and with appropriate instruction.
~

See Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P .3 d 1269 (parol evidence may be
considered by a jury only after finding of ambiguity by the trial court).
In an ironic twist, the State asks this Court to do what it successfully
persuaded the trial court not to do, i.e., examine the Operating Agreement to assess
whether it is (un)ambiguous. (State Br., pp. 22-29.) If the Operating Agreement is
unambiguous, then it is for the Court to apply its terms, including those relating to
authority.

(See Didericksen Br., pp. 29-30.)

If the State hoped to support a

conviction based on a claimed ambiguity, it should have endorsed Defendants'
repeated efforts to have the court review the document before giving it to the jury. 3

3

"[C]ontractual ambiguity can occur in two different contexts: ( 1) facial
ambiguity with regard to the language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with
regard to the intent of the contracting parties. The first context presents a question
of law to be determined by the judge. The second context presents a question of
fact where, if the judge determines that the contract is facially ambiguous, parol
evidence of the parties' intentions should be admitted. Thus, before permitting
recourse to parol evidence, a court must make a determination of facial
ambiguity." Daines, ,r 25 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
7
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If the trial court found the Operating Agreement ambiguous, it would also
have needed to identify the nature of the ambiguity. Is it specific provisions or the
document as a whole that is ambiguous? Does the ambiguity arise from missing
terms or the parties' course of conduct? See Daines,

,r 29.

Only after making these

initial determinations could the court meaningfully direct the jury as to its charge.
The trial court here did none of this, for the wholly insupportable reason that this is
not a civil case, as if defendants have fewer rights when their liberty is at stake. (See
Didericksen Br., p. 16.)
In suggesting that the error inherent in all this is harmless, the State
acknowledges that that the Operating Agreement contains language conferring broad
authority on Defendants to pursue business of real estate development generally, as
opposed to specific limitation to the 29 acres in Saratoga Springs. (State Br., pp. 3031.) The State's assertion that § 7.1 of the Operating Agreement nonetheless limits
management authority to development of the 29 acres in Saratoga Springs ignores
this additional language and is incorrect. The cited section limits management
authority to the "purposes herein stated," which would encompass all of the
purposes stated therein, including general real estate development.
The State's argument that specific language controls over general language
further supports Defendants' arguments in· this case.

The sole provision that

8 Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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explicitly states limitations regarding Defendants' authority in connection with the
nature of the business is § 7.4. 7.1, which reads:
There is an express limitation on the nature of the Business and the powers
granted the Managers herein, the Company is intended to purchase and
develop, hold and sale real estate for investment purposes only, and no
activities inconsistent with such limited purposes shall be undertaken.
This language is the most specific description of limitations on Defendants'
authority on this point and, under the State's argument, trumps the more generic
"business purpose" language cited by the State. 4
The State's assertion (State Br., p. 28) that member approval provisions, e.g.,
§ 7.5.1 prevented the managers from signing the checks at issue is not at all clear.
vi

But for a few instances (sequestration of $100,000, Count 8; and the two checks
totaling $50,000 reimbursement for a finder's fee obligation that even Kerry Posey

4

The State's assertion that Defendants violated the Operating Agreement's
provision to refrain from doing anything that would make it impossible to carry on
the LLC's ordinary affairs because ultimately there were not "funds it needed to
bring the 29 acres to entitlement" is legally and factually incorrect. As adduced at
trial, the re-zoning of the land and approval of the conceptual plan for the Tivoli
Development was accomplished. (R. 1537, p. 150:3-6.) Moreover, the charged
offense was spending money that Defendants had no authority to spend on a
particular purpose. That is far different from spending money unwisely, or
spending money that would become unauthorized later if a deficit developed. The
remedy, if any, for alleged violation of this provision would be in the civil courts.
In any event, the record reflects that was Bobbie Posey' s unauthorized LLC filings
and filing of a notice of default (thus precluding further financing), and not the
expenditures at issue, that made it "impossible" to carry on. (R. 153 7, p. 10: 1511 :25; R. 1535, p. 231 :21-234:4.)

9
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admitted was agreeable 5), the checks represented relatively small amounts compared
to the whole effort in each case. Nor do these three checks appear to fall into the
categories of "Purchase, receipt, lease, exchange or other acquisition of any real or
personal property or business" set out in the cited section.

II.

ALL BUT FOUR COUNTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, OR
A NEW TRIAL GRANTED, BECAUSE THE VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY STOLEN IS LIMITED TO THE
VICTIM'S INTEREST THEREIN.
In their opening briefs, Defendants pointed out that the Poseys had ( at most)

a 25 percent profits interest in the LLC. If Defendants were charged with stealing
property from the Poseys by writing the checks, the "value" of that property could
not exceed the Poseys' interest. On appeal, the State acknowledges that this issue
is one of law reviewed for correctness (State Br., p. 2), and does not contest the
correctness of the argument itself. Instead, the State changes its entire theory of
the case and asks the Court to find that the property stolen was not that of the
Poseys, but instead of the LLC. (State Br., pp. 32-40.) This it cannot do.
The State begins its analysis by noting that it is not a defense to theft that the
actor has an interest to the property, if another person has an interest that the actor
is not entitled to infringe.

(State Br., p. 33.)

Correct, but irrelevant:

While

Defendants could be charged with stealing property, the value of the property

5

R. 1533, p. 233:9-13.

10 Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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stolen - a required element of proof - is limited to the other person's interest. That.

proposition is both well settled (see Didericksen Br., p. 36) and obvious: If a
defendant "steals" a stack of 100 one dollar bills of which 50 are his own, he can
be charged with theft, but only of $50.6
The State then moves on to its principal argument, that the property stolen
~

was not that of the Poseys, but rather of the LLC.

As the State appears to

recognize, that is directly contrary to its argument at all prior stages of this case.
The State expressly charged Defendants with stealing the Poseys' - not the LLC's
- property. See R. 69-95 (Amended Information). At trial, the State argued that
the Poseys - not the LLC - were the victims. (E.g., R. 1554, pp. 80-81, R. 1538,

pp. 12-13, 17-19.) After trial, the State argued that the Poseys - not the LLC were the victims entitled to restitution.

R. 1064-70 (State's Restitution

Memorandum, and R. 1539 pp. 9, 12 (restitution hearing), and 14 (court referring
to Poseys as the "victims".). In ordering restitution for the benefit of the Poseys,

vs

the trial court necessarily found them - not the LLC - to be the "victims". See

6

The State suggests that the legislature has effectively overruled State v. Parker,
137 P.2d 626 (Utah 1943), which first articulated these basic concepts. That is
incorrect. Parker is cited for the proposition that (only) the value ·of the victim's
legal interest in the property is dispositive of the level of offense. That principle
remains unchanged.
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Utah Code §§ 77-38a-102(14) (defining "victim" for purposes of restitution
statute), 77-38a-302 (authorizing restitution to "victims").)7
The State seeks to excuse this abrupt retreat from its own allegations by
arguing that it would not have been required to prove the identity of the victim
below. (State Br., p. 38.) That might be true, but when it chose to do so for its
own strategic reasons, it could not affirmatively mis lead Defendants. In State v.
Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), the defendant argued that "a prejudicial

variance had occurred between the dates alleged in the information and the
evidence presented by the prosecution at trial." In addressing that issue, the Utah
Supreme Court first observed:
By definition, the right to constitutionally adequate notice requires that the
information given by the prosecution must be such that the defendant can
confidently rely on it in preparing for trial. Therefore, an essential corollary
of the defendant's right to obtain information on the alleged offense from the
prosecution is some rule or doctrine which assures that the information given
is reliable. The variance doctrine can fulfill this function by prohibiting the
prosecution from introducing at trial evidence that varies from the
information previously given, if that variance would prejudice a defendant's
case and if the defendant has not been allowed sufficient time before trial
(by means of a continuance if necessary) to prepare to meet the
prosecution's changed position.
The court went on:
7

The statute authorizes restitution only for "victims." If the Court agrees with the
State's new argument that the Poseys were not the victims, then the restitution
order in their favor is legally insupportable on its face and must be reversed on that
basis alone.

12 Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It would be a mockery of the constitutional rights of defendant to allow the
state to falsely state the particulars of the offense charged and then without
amendment and without giving defendant additional time to meet new
evidence beyond those particulars obtain a conviction founded on said
evidence.

For this reason, whenever the prosecution changes its position, a defendant
may seek a continuance. If the trial court finds the variance to be prejudicial,
it must grant a continuance as a matter of right.

Id, quoting State v. Myers, 5 Utah 2d 365, 372, 302 P.2d 276, 280 (1956); see also
State in interest of D.B., 2012 UT 65,

,r 44, 289 P.2d 459 ("the Sixth Amendment

is satisfied when a defendant ( 1) receives adequate notice that the State is pursuing
accomplice liability and (2) the State has not affirmatively misled the defendant";
reversing conviction for constitutionally inadequate evidence where State
developed an alternative liability theory after the close of evidence).
It is far too late now for the State to argue for the first time that the property
stolen was that of the LLC, not the Poseys. The trial is long over; no continuance
can protect Defendants from lack of notice of this new theory. If the convictions
vb

are to be affirmed, it must be on the factual and legal basis that the State charged,
and successfully argued at and after trial. That is particularly true when the trial
court was invited by the State to, and did, make an implicit factfinding that it was
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the Poseys (not the LLC) who had been damaged in the amount of 100% of the
checks. 8
The State's Brief makes no attempt to justify the convictions under the
actual basis upon which it charged and tried the case, and reversal is compelled.

III.

THE CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED FOR FAILURE TO
INSTRUCT ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
WRONGFUL APPROPRIATION.
From the principal briefs, it appears that several dispositive facts on this issue

are undisputed or uncontroverted:
•

Wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense of theft.

•

The only difference between wrongful appropriation and theft is the

length of time the defendant intended to hold the property.
•

Wrongful appropriation is a misdemeanor.

•

Convictions of wrongful appropriation would have resulted m non-

appealable acquittals on the felony theft charges.
•

Convictions of wrongful appropriation would have negated the most

serious felony count (Count 29, Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activities Act), because
wrongful appropriation is not a predicate act under the UPUAA.

8

In a footnote, the State notes that the Defendants attempted to argue at trial that
the funds were Tivoli assets, not the Poseys' money. As reflected in the citations,
this assertion was for the narrow purpose of rebutting the State's repeated assertion
that Defendants had stolen/ram the Poseys.
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•

Defendants and the State represented to the trial court that defense counsel

were withdrawing their request for a wrongful appropriation instruction because an
agreement had been reached between them, which agreement was then summarized
on the record.
•

Defense counsel claims that the agreement involved the State supporting a

request for the trial court to interpret the Operating Agreement post-verdict (which
seems supported by the transcript),9 and that the State reneged. The State claims that,
despite its concurrence on the record, it never actually intended to give any quid pro
quo to Defendants in exchange for their withdrawal of the wrongful appropriation

instruction.
Under such facts, only two possible conclusions can be drawn: 1) defense
counsel's decision was objectively unreasonable (if they simply dropped a critical
instruction for no gain), or 2) the State reneged on a deal.

Either way, the

convictions are tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel or manifest injustice.
~

In light of the uncontested circumstances, the State's speculation that the
defense could have come up with some other legitimate reason to give up the
instruction other than the bargain struck is beside the point. A theoretical basis for
foregoing an instruction is immaterial when it is undisputed acknowledged by the State - that counsel was relying on an agreement.
9

See Didericksen Br., p. 45.
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and was

In any event, however, the State's argument that foregoing the instruction
might have been justifiable if it put the State to a higher burden of proof (theft vs.
wrongful appropriation) is belied by what actually happened:

As noted in

Defendants' opening brief, the State told the jury that any intended deprivation even as short as 30 seconds - satisfied the elements of theft. In other words, the
State was not put to a higher theoretical burden of proof, and this claimed possibility
could not serve as a rational basis for foregoing such an important instruction.
As a final attempt to sustain the convictions, the State avers that "there was no
reason for the jury to believe that they [Defendants] intended to give the money back
after a temporary period." (State Br., p. 48.) That assertion is perplexing: If there
was no way that jurors could think the intended deprivation was temporary, why did
the State emphasize to the jury that it could still convict even if it believed the
intended deprivation to have been temporary? (See Didericksen Br., pp. 43-44.)
An instruction requires only some supporting evidence, and there was ample
evidence from which the jury could have found Defendants to have intended only a
temporary deprivation: Among other things, Defendants had - years before any
criminal charges were brought - already repaid, either directly or effectively, 11 of
the 12 checks upon which they were later convicted - including one check that said
"temporary adv[ ance]" on the memo line. See Add. Exh. A hereto. Moreover,
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Defendants had at least a 7 5% interest in the LLC, so they had a direct financial
incentive to return monies when appropriate to see the LLC succeed.
"[W]hen the defense requests a jury instruction on a lesser included offense,
the requirements for inclusion of the instruction should be liberally construed."

State v. Spiller, 2007 UT 13, ,r 10, 152 P.3d 315 (citations omitted); see also State
xi

v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28,

,r

39, 309 P.3d 209.

Defendants were entitled to a

wrongful appropriation instruction in this case. It was fatal error not to ask for or
give it, and reversal is warranted.

IV.

THE UPUAA COUNT SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF
LAW, OR THE CONVICTION REVERSED FOR FAILURE TO
GIVE A COMPLETE ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION.
More than four years before Defendants' trial, the Utah Supreme Court held

that the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activities Act requires, inter alia, that the activities
at issue "extend over a substantial period of time." The State acknowledges this.

(See State Br., pp. 52-53.) 10
The State argues, however, that "Defendants point to no Utah case, and the
State is aware of none, in which any Utah court has held that a 'substantial period of

10

The State coyly characterizes Hill v. Estate of Allred, 2009 UT 28, 216 P .3d 929
as "suggest[ing] that the 'continuing conduct' element of a UPUAA claim is
satisfied if the conduct 'extend[ed] over a substantial period of time." (State Br.,
pp. 52-53.) Hill did more than that; it quite clearly required a substantial period of
time (for closed continuity). See Didericksen Br., pp. 48-49.
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time' instruction must be included in a UPUAA case." (State Br., p. 49.) That
might be true, but the Utah Supreme Court has held - repeatedly - that a jury must
be instructed as to "all the legal elements that it must find to convict of the crime
charged, and the absence of such an instruction is reversible error as a matter of
law." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ,r 26, 52 P.3d 1210 (citations omitted).
The State argues that it is an "open question as to whether such an instruction
1s required," and that, "at the time of this trial, federal cases suggested that
instructions are sufficient if they instructed the jury on the pattern of activity
element, as well as the concept of continuity." (State Br., p. 53.) That is incorrect.
In the cases cited by the State, the temporal aspect of continuity was not at issue;
hence, none address a failure to instruct as to that requirement. Instead, the State's
cases (State Br., pp. 54-55) address only the separate issue of relatedness, finding
that concept to have been sufficiently described in other instructions.
There is a big difference between relatedness and the threat of continued
activity (closed/open continuity). See, e.g., U.S. v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 208-09
(3rd Cir. 1992) Qury instructions were inadequate were they addressed only
relatedness and not temporal components of continuity under RICO); Efron v.

Embassy Suites (Puerto Rico), Inc., 223 F. 3d 12 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting distinction
between relatedness and temporal components); Ward v. Nierlich, 61 7 F. Supp. 2d
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1226 (under RICO, plaintiff must establish that the predicate acts "were related and
that they amount to a threat of continued criminal activity") (emphasis added).
The State identifies no instruction that even addressed, let alone properly
directed, the jury on what was required to find a threat of continued activity (i.e.,
closed or open continuity). The complete absence of any instruction even touching
~

on this issue precludes a contention that the point was covered in other instructions,
as occurred in the cases cited by the State.
The State next speculates that there could have been a tactical reason for
Defendants failing to request this important instruction. According to the ~ State,
counsel could reasonably have foregone an instruction on closed continuity because
the State could then have argued for an alternative theory, open continuity. But that
could not have been a rational defense strategy: Requiring the State to prove open
continuity would not have subjected Defendants to any greater exposure or more
harmful evidence; it would only have increased the State's burden by requiring

"

additional evidence of intent to violate the statute for the requisite period of time.
The State's own discussion demonstrates this reality. (See pp. 56-58.) 11

11

vJP

~

The State indicates that requiring it to prove open continuity would have given it
incentive to show that Defendants' conduct was their "regular way of doing
business" and "prompt[ed] the prosecutor to now ask questions about Defendants'
business practices." (State Br., pp. 58, 59.) But the State already asked those
questions and repeatedly said this was Defendants' way of doing business (e.g., R.
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Finally, the State argues that "it is not probable that the jury would have
. acquitted [Defendants] on the UPUAA count if given the additional instruction."
(State Brief, p. 59.) The State theorizes that, had the instruction been given, it could
have shifted its theory to open continuity, which the jury would have found. Or, the
State says, the jury might have added in the last check to come up with nine months
instead of four, and "it is not reasonably likely that the jury would have found that a
nine-month period of thefts was not 'substantial."' (State Br., p. 60.)
These suggestions are both speculative and improbable.

The State was

sufficiently concerned about the short period of time involved that it assured the jury
that convictions could be entered regardless of the duration of intended deprivations.
It is more likely that a jury would find a $983.81 check written five months after the
last one to be an outlier - resulting in a four-month period insufficient to show
closed continuity - and a lack of open continuity where 99 .47 percent of the alleged

theft had occurred and concluded more than five months earlier.
Defendants, of course, submit that this issue should not even have reached a
jury, because either period of less than one year is insufficient as a matter of law.
The State does not dispute the long line of cases in which federal courts have
reached this same conclusion.

(See Didericksen Br., pp. 50-51.)

The State,

1538, p. 10:12-16, p. 31:14-15, p. 30:25-31:5). A jury instruction on continuity
would have posed no additional detriment to Defendants.
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however, cites two civil cases, one from the Ninth Circuit and one from a court
within the Ninth Circuit, Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d 1523 (9th. Cir. 1995), and
California Pharmacy Mgmt., LLC v Zenith Ins. Co., 669 F.Supp.2d 1152 (C.D. Cal.

2009) for the proposition that there is no "bright line" threshold in that circuit.
While those opinions do contain that language, even within the Ninth Circuit
~'[ c]ourts routinely find that alleged racketeering activity lasting less than a year does
not constitute a closed-ended pattern." Barsky v. Spiegel Accountancy Corp., 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16900 *20 (N.D. Cal. Feb 11, 2015), citing Turner v. Cook, 362
F.3d 1219, 1231 (9th Cir. 2004); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364,
366 (9th Cir. 1992). In Allwaste itself, for example, the court allowed amendment of
a complaint to add dates after noting that the plaintiff said it could prove conduct
over "thirteen months," which the court said would satisfy the closed continuity
requirement.
The State correctly notes that there is not presently a Utah appellate decision
recognizing under UPUAA what virtually all federal courts have recognized under
its'federal counterpart. But it can be both ineffective assistance of counsel and plain
error to fail to discover an overwhelming body of law that the Utah Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognized as instructive in construing UPUAA, including in Hill
itself. (See Didericksen Br., p. 52.)
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In sum: UPUAA imposes a minimum threshold of at least one year to allege
closed continuity. The facts alleged in the State's own Information show that the
statute cannot have been violated, and the UPUAA conviction should be reversed.
In the alternative only, the jury should have been instructed as to the "substantial
period"/threat of continuing activity and temporal requirements.

V.

THE RESTITUTION AWARD IS BOTH LEGALLY ERRONEOUS
AND MANIFESTLY UNJUST.
Defendants have raised several challenges to the trial court's restitution order

(to be reached only if the Court rejects all of Defendants arguments on the
convictions themselves). Contrary to the State's assertion, Defendants have argued
that the prior Settlement Agreement and Release executed by the parties precluded
recovery. 12 Appellants have further argued that under State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,
213 P .3d 104, any restitution awarded needs to be consistent with what could be
awarded in a civil action. 13
In addition to arguing that the settlement precluded an award of restitution,
Bruun and Didericksen argued at the restitution hearing below (and on appeal) that

12

See, e.g., Bruun brief, pp. 52-53. The State acknowledges that, although there
might be some differences in wording, the two Defendants' opening briefs were
"substantively identical raising the same arguments and issues in the same order and
relying on the same authority." (State Br., p. 4.)
13

See, e.g., Didericksen Br., pp. 54-55, and Bruun Br., pp. 54-55.
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due to the cons~deration paid and release given in connection with the Settlement
Agreement entered into by all parties, any recovery more than zero dollars would be
precluded by the restitution statutes. As pointed out to this Court, this is consistent
with the instructions the Supreme Court gives in Laycock. (Bruun Br., p. 54.)
The State essentially does not dispute most of these substantive points, but
~

instead seeks to recharacterize the argument in a certain way ("estoppel"), and then
claim that the thus-characterized argument was not preserved. (State Br., p. 62.) 14
However characterized (recovery precluded as a matter of law, as an offset, as
double recovery that is outside the restitution statute), Defendants have consistently
argued that the settlement and release preclude an award of restitution, just as the
State agrees was argued below (R. 1539, pp. 6-8). It cuts off a civil recovery of any

14

The State says that Defendants' arguments below are "estoppel" arguments, i.e.,
that the court below could not order any restitution due to the prior settlement.
Defendants did argue that the Settlement Agreement and Release had the effect of
precluding a recovery in a civil action, and that the very definition of pecuniary
damages that a court may award as restitution is limited to those recoverable in a
civil action (Utah Code § 77-3 8a-102( 6)) - and thus no restitution should be
awarded - and also argued that the payment ofvaluable consideration to the Poseys
(some $8 million worth of real property and $174,000 cash) made. anything more
than no recovery ($0.00) in restitution a double recovery for the Poseys and outside
the restitution statute. (R. 1350-53, R. 1539, p. 4:5-8:11.) The Laycock case was
also argued below at the restitution hearing. (R. 1539, pp. 21-22). So the State's
contention that the argument made on appeal (including the Laycock issue of prior
consideration in a settlement bearing on the award of restitution at least as to the
amount of complete restitution awarded) is unpreserved is simply wrong.
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pecuniary damages the Poseys might have suffered, and places them outside the
restitution statute by definition (e.g., definition of pecuniary damages recoverable).
Defendants also argued below that there was consideration for the settlement
(which the Poseys admitted in the document granting release) which the court
should have considered, and that the consideration already paid made an award of
restitution not only unjust but barred by statute and controlling case law (Laycock).
Defendants argued that due to giving the Poseys the greatly increased-in-value
property in the settlement (one consideration for their release of claims against
Defendants), the amount of possible recovery by the Poseys was $0.00, which is
what the Court should award in restitution. (R. 1348, 1350-52.) (In fact, Defendants
argued that the Defendants had overpaid in the settlement. See R. 13 51.) The
State's contention that the argument of consideration or set-off was not made below
is unfounded.
The State mischaracterizes the $25,000 payment in the settlement as
consideration for the Property returned. (State Br., p. 64.) To suggest that property
with an ultimate value of between $6.7 and $8.75 million (R. 1349-50) would be
exchanged for $25,000 is nonsensical. Indeed, the State's claim is not supported by
the cited settlement agreement, as the $25,000 payment is not identified as
consideration for transfer of property, but rather relates to the settlement agreement
and release generally. (R. 294.)
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The State now suggests that if setoffs are considered, there should be some
further accounting and Defendants should pay back the $25,000 they received in the
settlement. Although that would seem more an issue for the trial court on remand,
the contention lacks logical force: The settlement included a release of all claims,
including a release by Defendants of their claims against the Poseys. 15
In short, the Poseys released their claims regarding the checks in return for
consideration, taking the amounts of money represented by those checks outside the
definition of restitution awardable under § 77-38a-102(6). Under Laycock, those
amounts should not be included in court-ordered restitution even if the court would
be allowed to include the amounts in its calculation of "complete" restitution.
The State argues further that the restitution awarded could be justified as part
of a total effect of the thefts on Poseys, launching into some calculations that were
neither argued by the State nor addressed by the court below. But if calculating is to
be done: The defendants bought a property valued at less than one million dollars at
~

the time, re-zoned it, and signed it back over to the Poseys when it was worth
(according to UDOT) more than $8 million. The "total effect" on the supposed
victims was to make them very wealthy, at least in terms of land value. Defendants

15

That the Poseys did, too - in fact, for the very checks on which Defendants were
convicted, individually identified by check number - is another independent reason
why restitution is inappropriate. (See Exhibit B to the Settlement Agreement, State
Br. Add. E and Bruun Br. Add. F.)
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also kicked in $175,000 in cash to boot. Even subtracting the $25,000 the State
suggests, this leaves the victims much enriched.
In the restitution proceeding, the State cherry-picked language from Laycock
to support its argument, and does so now on appeal. Under Laycock, amounts that
were the subject of a prior settlement can be included in determination of "complete
restitution," but that is not the same thing - nor should it be - as actually ordering
those amounts be paid. Laycock, at least in dictum, reaffirms that an amount not
recoverable in a civil action is not properly awarded in restitution. This direction
was not heeded by the court below in this case.

VII. CUMULATIVEERROR
The State acknowledges that, if the cumulative effect of multiple errors
undermines confidence that Defendants received a fair trial, this Court should
reverse. (State Br., p. 66.) This case involved numerous irregularities and the errors
argued by Defendants on appeal, even if no single one warranted reversal itself,
would compel reversal to remedy their cumulative effect.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the opening brief, the Court
should reverse and remand the judgment with instructions to dismiss all counts or
alternatively for a new trial on some or all of the issues presented on appeal.
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•

•

•

•

•

•

ADDENDUM A
Check#
1012

Check Memo
Advance

Amount
$5,300.00

Count
3

1015
1016
1029
1041
1047
1098
1051

Dum Fees Lot #16
Tern Adv
GWT, Inc. - Landsca in
Trailer
[no memo]
Advance/Dier
Uinta Shadows, Roosevelt,
UT Earnest Monies

$4,080.00
$4,500.00
$3,475.00
$4,015.52
$5,000.00
$4,000.00
$7,500.00

4
5
15
19
21
22
24

Lot Closing Hidden Acres
Lot #2

$3 1,506.85

1007

1018

Loan

$ 18,493.15
*$50,000.00

2

7

Re aid/Witness
Yes/Bruun
Yes/Mutter (State
Investi ator)
Yes/Bruun
Yes/Bruun
Yes/Bruun
Yes/Mutter
Yes/Bruun
Yes/Bruun
Yes/Bruun
Yes/M utter

Yes/Mutter (by " finders
fee" to John Sather)
Yes/Bruun
Yes/Bruun

Record Citation re Re a ment
R1523 , p 278 :23-25
R1534, p 2 15: 10-1 5

R1536, 179:18-1 82: 10
R1536, 137:5-139:6
R 1536, 213:13-17
R1534, 281:18-283: 10
Rl 536, 267:3-269:4
Rl536, 243 :3-244:24
Rl536, p 277:20-281: 10
Rl534, p 246:23 -247:5

,

R 1534, p 21 3:13-215:3
R 1535, p 313:6-314:1
R l536, 127:13-128:6
Rl536, 151 :12-158:1

-ii
Yes/Prince (Bookkeeper)

Rl537, p 134:4-135 :17 (these monies were
used to pay the obligations of Tivoli Properties,
LLC
*Total of $50,000.00 to Granite Builders - approximate value of a Granite Builders truck given to John Sather as a "finders fee" - composition to
satisfy $100,000 fee obligation to Mr. Sather - effectively reimbmsing Tivoli.
1019

Const. Deposit

$ 100,000.00
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